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Change and Continuities: Taiwan’s
Post-2008 Environmental Policies 
Simona A. GRANO 
Abstract: In representative governments, a healthy turnover of power 
among ruling parties is viewed as a critical sign of democratic prin-
ciples. In a political environment where voters’ opinion is the key 
political driver, the greatest challenge facing the NGO community is 
often that environmental concerns only represent secondary aspects 
of the policy-making process. This article focuses on the transfor-
mations (or lack thereof) in Taiwan’s environmental governance, 
under different political parties, particularly during the past few years. 
I begin with an overview of the key issues that have characterised 
Taiwan’s environmental movement and its battles, starting with the 
democratic transition of the mid-1980s, before focusing on two de-
velopmental projects – Taiwan’s eighth petrochemical plant and 
fourth nuclear power facility – to bring to light the most significant 
changes and continuities in the environmental-policy realm. I pay 
special attention to the post-2008 period and the ensuing renaissance 
experienced by the environmental movement, among others. The 
final section considers the consequences of the KMT’s second elect-
oral victory – in January 2012 – for environmental policies and, in 
light of the article’s findings, summarises what has changed and what 
has consistently remained the same under different ruling parties.  
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Introduction 
Now that Ma Ying-jeou’s (Ma Yingjiu) administration is well into its 
second term, it is timely to evaluate the changes and continuity of 
environmental politics after 2008. In this article, I have chosen to 
focus on two protracted environmental disputes – the Kuokuang 
Petrochemical Technology Co. (഻ݹ⸣ॆ、ᢰ , Guoguang shihua 
keji; KPT) and the fourth Nuclear Power Plant (NPP-4) – both of 
which spanned across the 2008 change of ruling party.  
While many people mistakenly think of green politics and envir-
onmentalism as secondary aspects of a state’s main responsibilities, 
environmental politics reveal a great deal about how governments 
operate in other sectors of society. The connection between politics 
and ecological issues is very strong in Taiwan, a country in which the 
two main political parties use the environment as a tool to attack each 
other while competing for votes. The Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) insists that the Kuomintang (KMT or “Nationalist Party”, 
Guomindang) is irresponsible in its pro-development stance, while 
the KMT galvanises support among pro-business elites by spreading 
the notion that the DPP is anti-industry. While numerous countries 
share similar situations, Taiwan is somewhat special in this regard. 
Environmental issues have played a key role in Taiwanese politics for 
the past 30 years (in the early democratisation process, in the DPP 
political strategy and, lately, in the political turn-over between DPP 
and KMT). Paradoxically, environmental policies have not yet been 
fundamentally transformed for the better. Therefore, the main argu-
ment of this article is that continuities are stronger than changes. In 
other words, the “business as usual” mentality continues unabated 
although party politics and developmental plans that are deemed in 
the “national interest” are often sugar-coated in a “light green” dis-
course. Following this new official positioning of the authorities vis-
à-vis ecological issues, the increasing use of rules-based participatory 
approaches, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (⫠ຳ䂅
ՠࡦᓖ⌅ĭġ huanjing pinggu zhidu fa, 1994; EIA) on the part of activists 
(mis)-leads many people to think that green issues are politically far 
more relevant than what they really are. In fact, environmental con-
cerns and Taiwan’s ecological deterioration are often depicted by the 
media – especially in the aftermath of such newsworthy events as the 
Fukushima nuclear meltdown. Also, political parties, aware of the 
  Taiwan’s Post-2008 Environmental Policies 131
 

 
increasing importance of the powerful pro-green rhetoric, exploit 
such issues to attract votes, without any real commitment. This sig-
nals a change from the past, when political campaigns were almost 
exclusively focused on unification with the PRC and economic devel-
opment (Fell 2013). However, as we shall see with the analysis of the 
two case studies, environmental activists have also learned how to 
make use of this powerful rhetoric and of the specific, strategic time 
in which events take place, in order to achieve their aims.  
After a protracted period of green civil society being dormant, 
which coincided more or less with the Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shui-
bian) administration (2000–2008), Taiwan’s environmental movement 
has experienced a phase of resurgence and vitality since 2008 (Ho 
2010: 16). From 2008 to 2010, environmentalists fought against the 
construction of Taiwan’s controversial eighth naphtha cracker (ޛ䕅 
ba qing), namely the development project of KPT in Zhanghua Coun-
ty (ᖠॆ㑓Ī, which was officially terminated by President Ma Ying-
jeou in April 2011. ġ
NPP-4, in Gongliao district (䋒ሞ॰Īġ (New Taibei City), a long-
standing developmental project marred in controversy, has also been 
stopped thanks to the efforts of anti-nuclear activists and environ-
mental NGOs. Among the most significant changes to have taken 
place during the second Ma administration is the linking and coming 
together of social movements with different goals and orientations; 
from those advocating to stop nuclear energy and those dedicated to 
purely local issues to those protesting over state matters such as the 
political future of the island and various trade agreements with China.  
Such a development occurred partly due to the DPP’s marginal 
position as a credible counterweight to the government after losing 
the 2008 elections, and partly due to strategic events that have en-
dowed civil society with new strength and placed great pressure on 
the government. However, while such changes are certainly positive 
for the future of Taiwan’s democratic system, my analysis of the two 
watershed cases will show that, as far as the environmental move-
ment is concerned, important decisions are still being reached mainly 
out of pre-electoral concerns. Therefore, it is currently too soon to 
tell whether episodes such as the halting of NPP-4 represent true 
successes for green activists or if they are just temporary decoys by 
the authorities to defer the ultimate decision. 
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Research Methods 
This research is based on 17 in-depth interviews with environmental 
professionals and participant observation conducted in Taiwan in the 
period 2011–2012. Short interviews were also conducted with ten 
individuals who have frequent contact with environmental profes-
sionals through their work at the Environmental Protection Admin-
istration, at various law firms offering environmental legal services, or 
in academic circles. These include local and central officials, lawyers 
and medical and toxicology experts who are often called to take part 
in Environmental Impact Assessment Reviews. Of the 17 subjects, 
ten were male and seven were female. Field research for the first of 
the two case studies was conducted in Taibei City and Zhanghua 
County from June 2011 to January 2012. Among social activists op-
posing the two projects, the interviewees included numerous grass-
roots NGOs, several members of Taiwan’s Green Party and two 
medical experts. Local residents of Zhanghua County were also inter-
viewed several times. The case study on NPP-4 is based on a mixed 
body of data, including case studies by medical and health profes-
sionals (in the case of nuclear wastes dumped on Orchid Island), 
surveys by governmental agencies and researchers, investigative re-
ports and news articles in printed and online media, and ethnographic 
first-hand evidence obtained by the author via interviews and partici-
pant observation during seven months of fieldwork. 
The remainder of this article consists of five main sections. Sec-
tion 1 discusses the main changes in the environmental arena after 
the DPP’s rise to power. Section 2 examines the first of the two case 
studies – Taiwan’s eighth naphtha cracker. Section 3 discusses NPP-
4. Section 4 summarises, in light of the main findings of these two 
relevant cases, the main changes and continuities that have affected 
green policies in Taiwan under different ruling parties. The final sec-
tion reaches some conclusions regarding the main issues addressed in 
the paper.  
I have followed three criteria for choosing these case studies 
from among the numerous environmental protests of the past few 
years. Firstly, I have deliberately selected two developmental cases 
that represent protracted controversies (although NPP-4 has a much 
longer history than KPT), which have huge social and environmental 
repercussions and are under constant media attention. Secondly, both 
of these cases represent successes for the environmental movement, 
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which has either managed to stop or to stall construction. In fact, 
while KPT was eventually cancelled, NPP-4 has been “put on hold” 
by the KMT government after protracted protests on part of students 
and activists, riding on the anti-governmental discontent that gained 
momentum after the rise of the Sunflower movement in March–April 
2014. Thirdly, this article focuses particularly on the party politics/ 
NGO activism dimension, as well as in the law/policy approach, 
present in both cases. As we shall see, the ultimate and most im-
portant deciding factors for both projects were politics and political 
interests. In fact, while activists have made extensive use of available 
laws and regulations and built a solid case, especially in the KPT con-
troversy, these were not enough to have the project stopped. What 
settled the issue and brought the project to an end was a statement 
released from the presidential palace. The same can be said for NPP-4. 
Even though protesters resorted to “impact-oriented” actions, such 
as mass rallies, and also sought to employ legal means at their disposal, 
such as changing the Referendum Act (ޜ≁ᣅ⾘⌅, gongmin toupiao fa)ĭ 
party politics played the decisive role in the ultimate decision to stop 
the facility for the time being. At any rate, both cases are deeply en-
meshed in politics and have seen the involvement and positioning of 
all political parties present on the scene. Therefore, these two projects 
have been chosen because they are emblematic of what has been at 
issue in the environmental politics of contemporary Taiwan.  
Environmental Politics under the DPP  
Environmental issues were among the most important factors that 
led people to vote for the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, 
ending 55 years of uninterrupted rule by the Nationalist Party (Arrigo 
and Puleston 2006). A number of fortuitous elements ensured higher 
visibility for environmental issues in the presidential campaigns in 
2000. These included the strong earthquake that hit Taiwan in 1999, 
revealing the low quality of buildings and cheap constructions all over 
the country, and daily scandals of small-sized businesses disposing 
liquid and solid wastes into water bodies and landfills with impunity. 
During the presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), a period that 
Taiwanese scholar Ho Ming-sho has termed as the “Incorporation” 
phase, numerous activists and reform-oriented individuals were first 
drafted to help the DPP formulate policy proposals and then inte-
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grated into the actual decision-making process. However, the benefits 
obtained were more symbolic than anything else and were not able to 
produce any significant structural change (Ho 2010: 13–16, 2005b). 
Furthermore, institutionalisation of green groups led militants to 
discard confrontational techniques in favour of more cooperative 
behaviours.  
Pre-electoral canvasses and tactics often focus on warning elect-
orates about the risks of victory by the opposing party. In reality, 
many issues actually remain exactly the same. An example is Taiwan’s 
environmental deterioration, which the DPP vowed to put an end to 
since at least the 1990s and which continued unabated even after the 
party won its first presidential election in 2000. Prior to this water-
shed victory, Taiwan’s future president, Chen Shui-bian, had prom-
ised to scrap controversial projects such as NPP-4, to clean up pol-
luted sites, and to enforce more stringent environmental regulations 
(Arrigo and Puleston 2006; Interview 9 2011a). Under direct pressure 
from either the DPP or from activists who had joined the party hop-
ing to bring positive results, numerous provisions for environmental 
protection were enacted. At the local level, cities and towns were 
cleaned up, a recycling system was established, and increased trans-
parency of operations and a more inclusive attitude towards activists 
became the norm (Arrigo and Puleston 2006: 170). A number of 
issues encouraged many Taiwanese to vote for Chen Shui-bian, in the 
hope of replicating such positive results on the national level. These 
included the establishment of a capillary system for garbage collection, 
the setting up of numerous recycling facilities island-wide, and efforts 
to improve the ecological and residential environments of small 
towns and cities. For environmental activists and eco-conscious indi-
viduals, the change in ruling parties represented a chance to redress 
the various imbalances that had led Taiwanese people and their rulers 
to favour economic growth over ecological concerns for more than 
four decades. 
However, after the DPP began its ascent to “institutionalisation”, 
winning more than one-third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan 
election of 1992, it gradually assumed a more cautious approach to-
wards social movements, aiming to change its image of an “unrefined” 
party (Ho 2005a: 407), and towards environmental issues, considered 
as an obstacle to economic development. In fact, as a budding dem-
ocracy with an industrial system in the making, the regime had to 
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sacrifice its goals and compromise with big businesses in order to 
consolidate the country’s economic development (Williams and 
Chang 2008: 88; Jobin 2010: 48). Barely four years into Chen Shui-
bian’s presidency, green activists were greatly disappointed with the 
ambivalence of many DPP legislators towards scrapping controversial 
plants or sacrificing economic goals to protect the environment 
(Jobin 2010: 48; Lyons 2009: 69). In order to stabilise its precarious 
situation as a “leading party” while the KMT continued to enjoy bet-
ter local contacts and a capillary distribution of power at the localities, 
the DPP sought a compromise that would involve sacrificing envir-
onmental protection to make it more “acceptable” in the eyes of big 
business conglomerates (Arrigo and Puleston 2006: 171). Some of the 
most “liberalising” actions towards industries were met during Chen 
Shui-bian’s presidency. The legal framework concerning science parks 
was revised by the Legislative Yuan with the aim of releasing these 
parks from the control of local governments. Consequently, these 
parks became grey areas, immune from laws such as the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Act (Interview 8 2011). 
This change of attitudes angered environmentalists who, in 1996, 
established a new political organ, the Green Party of Taiwan (GP), 
modelled after its German counterpart (Interview 9 2011b). This 
party aimed to attract people who felt betrayed by the DPP’s change 
of heart towards environmental protection. While the DPP was ini-
tially concerned about this new political adversary, the GP failed to 
become a full-fledged political party that could threaten the DPP’s 
electoral base. During the most recent presidential election, held in 
January 2012, numerous Taiwanese had never even heard of a Lüdang 
(ਠ⚓㏐唘 , Taiwan Lüdang). The Green Party received almost 
230,000 votes in 2012, increasing its share nearly threefold (from 0.6 
per cent in 2008 to 1.74 per cent in 2012) and making it the country’s 
fifth political party. Despite this, it did not succeed in reaching the 5 
per cent threshold required to win a seat in the legislature (Chiu 2012). 
In the minds of many Taiwanese, the DPP remained the country’s 
real “green” party (Jobin 2010: 48; Williams and Chang 2008: 88). 
Even though numerous activists maintain that the DPP betrayed 
its commitments towards the environment, numerous positive results 
for the implementation of a green governance system were neverthe-
less reached under its aegis. While an EIA had been in place since the 
1970s (Lyons 2009: 62), it was a façade framework, designed to ap-
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pease environmentalists’ concerns while catering to the interests of 
businesses (Ho 2004: 240). In 1994, a series of effective measures 
such as the acquisition of veto power on projects and increased pub-
lic participation through public hearings, turned the EIA into an ef-
fective tool for individuals trying to access political decisions regard-
ing developmental projects (Ho 2004: 240). Additionally, the leaders 
of an increasing number of social movements were drafted by the 
DPP in the actual writing phase of environmental legislation drafts, 
reaching an unprecedented level of efficacy (Lyons 2009: 62). How-
ever, the most visible changes in the environmental realm took place 
at the local level, in townships and villages, where numerous DPP-
dominated counties, which were more sympathetic and encompassing 
towards social activists, enacted new pollution-curbing regulations 
and recruited numerous social activists into their ranks.  
With the increased institutionalisation of social activists, envir-
onmental protesters shifted their modus operandi from the streets to 
more formal policy channels. More conventional “contentious pol-
itics” forms of dissent have only recently been revived in connection 
with the campaign on the part of activists to stop the construction of 
NPP-4, rekindled since 2011, or against the KPT naphtha cracker 
(2008–2011). Nuclear energy issues and the chemical industry’s pollu-
tion have both gradually lost importance in the past decade (Jobin 
2010: 50). However, the recent Fukushima nuclear catastrophe (⾿ጦ
Ṩ⚭, fudao he zai) and planning efforts for the construction of a facil-
ity of the caliber of KPT caused environmental concerns to feature 
prominently during the pre-electoral presidential campaign in 2011 
(Jobin 2012; Interview 13 2011c; Interview 14 2011d). One of the 
basic tenets of Tsai YingĮwen (Cai Yingwen, the DPP presidential 
candidate), which was consistently reiterated throughoutġ that year, 
was the goal of turning Taiwan into a “nuclear-free homeland” (䶎Ṩ
ᇦൂ, feihe jiayuan) by 2025 (Tsai 2011; Jobin 2012).  
Even though it is perfectly legitimate to try and understand the 
DPP/KMT rivalry from an environmental perspective, the two de-
velopmental projects chosen for this study will clearly illustrate how 
environmental issues still take a back seat in Taiwan’s politics com-
pared to issues such as independence/unification and political cor-
ruption. A more eco-friendly outcome, as was the case in the two 
chosen developmental projects, is to be expected only if politicians 
are afraid of losing votes if they do not comply with popular will 
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regarding several high-profile projects (Tang 2011: 3). KPT’s petro-
chemical plant is a perfect example of such power dynamics. 
Kuokuang Petrochemical Technology Co.:
A Success Story  
As mentioned above, scholars and citizens often mistakenly think of 
“environmental issues” as only remotely connected to politics. In 
recent years, however, the link between “green issues”, social move-
ments and the course of politics has become stronger. A good example 
is to be found in the decision that drove President Ma Ying-jeou to 
halt the construction of controversial KPT petrochemical plant in 
Zhanghua, almost certainly out of pre-electoral concerns and fear of 
losing votes. 
Like other East Asian states, Taiwan started its first naphtha-
cracking activities during its post-war industrial development in the 
late 1960s. The island’s eighth naphtha cracker was conceived by 
China Petroleum Corporation (CPC) with the aim of relocating its 
crude refining plants in southern Taiwan’s Gaoxiong City to Zhang-
hua by 2015 (Interview 6 2011; Ho 2014b: 11), where it planned to 
invest 400 billion TWD (12.57 billion USD) to build the KPT com-
plex. KPT Co. is actually an affiliate of state-run oil refiner CPC Corp 
Taiwan (ਠ⚓ѝ⋩, Taiwan Zhongyou) and the project in Zhanghua 
aimed to expand the country’s oil-refining capacity and the produc-
tion of chemical products such as ethylene.ġ
The naphtha cracker was originally planned in 1995 and set to be 
in Yunlin County, specifically in the Lidao Industrial park (䴒ጦᐕᾝ
ൠ॰, Lidao Gongye Diqu)ġ (Ho and Shieh 2011: 38). The project did 
not take off, for a number of reasons, and around 2005 the plan to 
build the complex in another locality of Yunlin County, Taixi – at the 
time still ruled by a KMT administration – resurfaced (Interview 6 
2011). In 2006, after the DPP gained power, attitudes towards such 
developmental projects became less friendly for investors (Interview 
6 2011; Ho 2014b: 11). Accordingly, CPC decided to relocate to 
Zhanghua County, where local authorities had shown interest in the 
idea of hosting the petrochemical complex. 
Between 2008 and 2010 the developmental project came under 
intense island-wide opposition from environmental NGOs, both 
locally and in Taibei, from university professors, green activists and 
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concerned professionals. The main fears related to the destruction of 
the wetland on which the complex would have been built (Wu and 
Wu 2011), as well as the livelihood of oyster fisheries, an industry that 
employs several thousand people in Zhanghua County alone (Lin et 
al. 2010; Interview 10 2011b).   
This case is considered a milestone since it has ignited the 
strongest opposition to an industrial project in Taiwan in decades – 
and as such has been the focus of various studies and books in Tai-
wan (e.g., Ho and Shieh 2011; Wu and Wu 2011; Lin Le-hsin et al. 
2010). Nevertheless, it is worth focusing on the rules-based participa-
tory approaches that protesters employed to channel their fight inside 
the legal arena, in order to best discern what has changed and what 
has remained the same in Taiwan’s environmental policy-making 
approach. The main findings of this paper confirm that KPT was 
opposed and ostracised because the protesters’ view, it had no soci-
etal need and it was perceived as risky for both human health and the 
local ecosystem (Interview 17 2011b). The benefits that the developer 
and the local government were keen to highlight were thought to be 
in the interest of a small minority of pro-business elites rather than of 
the general public. On top of that, the general opinion among those 
who opposed the project was that the developer, CPC, was violating 
the EIA Act and did not actually fulfill all the legal requirements 
needed to build such a facility (Interview 15 2011; Interview 11 
2011c). 
According to the protesters, the project was in violation of two 
important state regulations. The first was the “National Preservation 
Project of Taiwan’s Shore and Tidal Lands”, set up by the Republic 
of China (ROC) government in 1973 with the aim of protecting Tai-
wan’s shores (Interview 11 2011c). According to these provisions, 
any project that is set in a “medium-range protection zone” (а㡜؍
䆧ൠ॰, yiban baohu diqu), such as Dacheng (བྷ෾Īġand Fangyuan (㣣㤁Īġ
(the two counties among which KPT was supposed to be built), 
should blend in with the natural surroundings, being “barely notice-
able” in order to inflict the least possible harm to the ecosystem. 
Furthermore, extra precautions are to be employed, even to take 
small of amounts of rocks and sands from areas that fit into this cat-
egory in order to avoid causing any damage to the environment. In 
light of these findings, my sources maintain that the choice of build-
ing the petrochemical facility on an unspoiled wetland, known for its 
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oyster fisheries and precious ecosystem, was in violation of the same 
legal provisions set by the state in the above-mentioned regulations 
(Interview 11 2011b).  
The second piece of legislation, namely the Regulations for Non-
Urban Land Use, stipulates that in case a developer does not obtain a 
special permission (my sources in the legal community – lawyers Lu 
Shi-wei and Chan Shun-kuei – claim that CPC did not have such a 
permit), it cannot locate any developmental activity within three kilo-
metres of a wetland (subparagraph 9) without breaking the above-
mentioned law of the ROC regarding shore land and coastal areas 
(Interview 2 2011; Interview 11 2011a).  
Finally, protesters had doubts about the overall financial benefits 
that such a costly project would have for Taiwan’s economy. Prof. 
Chen Chi-chung (an economist who specialises in cost-benefits ana-
lysis) and Professor Wu (a toxicologist already involved in the health-
damages analysis of the sixth cracker) estimated that due to the 
amount of additional costs CPC did not take into account, such as an 
increase in cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (Interview 16 2011), 
rising unemployment rates among fishermen, impact on tourism and 
seafood industries, rising greenhouse gases’ discharge emissions (and 
subsequent potential sanctions by the international community for 
failing to meet air quality standards), the total cost of KPT would 
fluctuate from 56.9 billion TWD to 112.1 billion TWD per year. This 
would cause the financial returns to be considerably lower, amount-
ing to 36.5 billion TWD per year (Interview 4 2011). In Chen’s opin-
ion, it would be impossible to fully compare the impacts and the 
benefits of KPT without previously conducting an EIA that takes 
into consideration the impact on the livelihoods of the fishermen 
affected (including the amount for their compensation) and on rivers 
and the marine ecosystem after the discharge of wastewaters pro-
duced by the naphtha cracker, a provision which is also included in 
the Standards for Evaluating the Environmental Impact of Develop-
mental Activities (Interview 4 2011). 
Protesters made extensive use of rules-based participatory ap-
proaches, both by attending EIA meetings and public hearings and by 
involving a legal firm, Primordial Law Firm (ݳⵏ㚟ਸ⌅ᖻһउᡰ, 
Yuanzhen Lianhe Falü Shiwusuo) and an association dedicated to 
legal matters, Wild At Heart Taiwan (ਠ⚓㹫䟾ᗳ䏣⭏᝻঄ᴳ, Taiwan 
Manye Xinzu Shengtai Xiehui). The Primordial Law Firm engages in 
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a broad spectrum of legal activities, such as international trade, intel-
lectual property as well as environmental law. Wild At Heart Taiwan, 
on the other hand, is a public interest organisation that was estab-
lished in 2003 and works to restore and preserve Taiwan’s fragile 
environment. Among its professional activities, the organisation of-
fers legal assistance to environmental groups or concerned individuals 
that fight on behalf of nature. Among their most prominent members 
is US-born attorney Robin Winkler (᮷冟ᖜĭġWen LubinĪĭġ who ran 
for election in the presidential election of 2012 for the Green Party 
(Interview 15 2011). 
While the final shelving of this project might lead us to think of 
this case as a success for the environmental movement, most of the 
numerous activists and experts interviewed did not consider it a vic-
tory (Interview 6 2011; Interview 10 2011a; Interview 11 2011a and 
2011b; Interview 15 2011; Interview 12 2011b). According to Tsai 
Pei-hui, spokesperson for Taiwan’s Rural Front (an NGO involved in 
fighting against unjust land appropriation on part of the government), 
“The EIA was dominated by political forces” (Interview 12 2011b). 
Activists reject the procedural process through which they obtained 
the halting of KPT, arguing that the EIA Committee, in light of all 
the legal documents provided, should have thrown out the case im-
mediately. What happened instead was that, on 22 April 2011, the 
committee offered two alternatives: (1) stopping the project or (2) 
going ahead with it upon approval of certain conditions. Legal firms 
representing the opposing faction believe that the case should have 
been stopped by the EIA Committee for violating two of the ROC 
laws set up to protect shore land. Instead, it was President Ma Ying-
jeou’s political statement that settled the developmental case at the 
end of April 2011, as a result of which CPC withdrew the project. 
Consequently, the institution of the EIA results greatly weakened. 
Additionally, opponents of KPT have failed to establish a legal prece-
dent, which would have been useful for future references. According 
to Prof. Tsai, this solution left the impression that the case had been 
given a green light by the EIA Committee and was then subsequently 
killed by politicians. “It doesn’t bode well for the future” (Interview 
12 2011a). 
What this case shows is that while Taiwan’s environmental gov-
ernance system has gradually changed from a purely top-down organ-
isational structure into an increasingly bottom-up structure with aug-
  Taiwan’s Post-2008 Environmental Policies 141
 

 
mented public participation in the policy-making process (for example, 
EIA), these transformations are not yet deep enough to tackle the 
problem of an unbalanced distribution of power and to reduce the 
influence of the pro-business elite. Structural constraints to an effec-
tive environmental management are still numerous. Another central 
aspect is that of “strategic timing” on part of protesters, which en-
sured a “positive outcome” due to politicians’ heightened attention 
towards societal discontent, out of pre-electoral concerns.  
Similarly, after years in which nuclear concerns were almost for-
gotten, 2011 marked the beginning of a new era for anti-nuclear ac-
tivists, in an ongoing controversy that has spanned across two dec-
ades and, in the aftermath of the Sunflower movement protest, re-
mains more disputed than ever. In this way, it symbolises, at best the 
character of continuity of environmental policies in Taiwan. 
NPP-4: Continuity under Different Political  
Parties
Despite the importance of KPT, and despite changes taking place at 
the political level, the anti-nuclear controversy exemplifies the degree 
of continuity that characterises numerous issues in the environmental 
sphere. The saga of NPP-4 is an ongoing story of intrigue, political 
corruption and drama that has outlasted two changes of ruling parties 
and clearly illustrates the strong link between environmental and pol-
itical issues in Taiwan. While nuclear energy concerns had been lying 
dormant for a while, anti-nuclear activists found renewed vigour after 
the Fukushima incident of 11 March 2011.  
While Taiwan’s first three nuclear power plants were all built be-
fore the lifting of martial law, and therefore had no public involve-
ment or opposition, the KMT government first announced its inten-
tion to build a fourth nuclear power plant through its state-run com-
pany, Taipower, in the 1980s (Lupke 2012: 159–160). The project was 
nearly cancelled twice; individuals involved in its construction and 
planning have been imprisoned on corruption charges and at least 
two people have been sentenced to death for actions connected to 
the project. Still, although construction of this plant has been clouded 
by political and corruption scandals, it is by now almost complete, 
except for the loading of fuel rods, which has been temporarily put 
on hold by the KMT, as we shall see later in this section.  
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The saga of NPP-4 is widely known among the general public of 
Taiwan since its story has been depicted in detail by the media and 
dissected from virtually every possible angle, from journalistic repor-
tages on the television show “Our Island” (Women de Dao 2011) to 
protests that take the form of politically dissenting documentaries 
such as “Gongliao – how are you?” (䋒ሞ֐ྭ௾?, Gongliao ni hao ma?) 
by Tsui Su-hsin, secretary-general of Green Citizens Action Alliance  
(㏐㢢ޜ≁㹼अ㚟ⴏ, Lüse Gongmin Xingdong Lianmeng). Since its 
very first planning phase, right at the time when democracy and polit-
ical freedom were slowly settling in (after 1987), protests clustering 
around the Gongliao plant contained a distinctive mix of elements 
from political power, public involvement, local and central govern-
ment frictions and grassroots activism that would have been re-
pressed in Taiwan only a few years earlier (Lupke 2012: 157).  
In 1986, the DPP enshrined the anti-nuclear cause in the party’s 
charter. Chen Shui-bian had vowed to stop the construction of NPP-4 
once and for all as soon as it gained power. However, five months 
after winning the presidency in 2000, the DPP made a reckless move 
to terminate the project, without prior consultation or approval from 
the Legislative Yuan (Ho 2005a: 412). The KMT tried to use this faux 
pas to its advantage and brought impeachment charges against Chen 
who, in an attempt to avoid any further escalation of tensions, in-
volved the Constitutional Court. The latter released its ruling in fa-
vour of the continuation of the project on 15 January 2001 (Ho 
2005a: 412) and construction of NPP-4 resumed one month later.  
While nuclear issues had been lying dormant for more than a 
decade, the Fukushima incident has given anti-nuclear activists new 
stamina to fight the power plant (Ho 2014a). Their efforts are mainly 
directed at stopping the construction of NPP-4, with little discussion 
regarding Taiwan’s three other (already functioning) nuclear plants. 
To achieve their goals, activists have made use of the powerful im-
agery of death evoked by the Fukushima Daiichi incident, as an ex-
ample of what could take place on Taiwanese soil in case of a nuclear 
accident (Interview 13 2011d; Interview 9 2011b). Critics of NPP-4, 
just like those of KPT, have doubts about the need for such a costly 
project and question whether the plant is “in the public interest” or 
simply for the benefit of a small but powerful business elite.  
Doubts regarding the project arise out of the consistent discrep-
ancies between energetic shortages emphasised by the government 
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and by the pro-development faction (Taiwan Power Company 2012; 
Women de Dao 2013), on one hand, and what environmental activists 
believe is in fact a surplus of energy reserves that Taiwan has accumu-
lated in the past two decades, without the contribution of a fourth 
nuclear plant, on the other (Interview 13 2011c; Interview 7 2011). 
An increased perception of risk following Japan’s nuclear disaster in 
2011, as well as the outing of several influential political and business 
leaders (for example, Fubon Financial Group) has lent greater credi-
bility to anti-nuclear activists in media outlets and public debates. The 
fact that Taiwan is a seismically active country, like Japan, has raised 
concerns about the safety of NPP-4 (Mo 2013b), especially consider-
ing that the plant is being built in the immediate vicinity of over 50 
schools, at a distance of 40 km from the capital, Taibei and within a 
radius of approximately 100 underwater volcanoes, some of which 
are still active (Chao 2011; Interview 13 2011b). Secondly, poor man-
agement on the part of governmental bureaus and Taipower regard-
ing the nuclear waste facility on Orchid Island, where numerous leaks 
have caused radioactive material to seep into nearby sea and land 
(Interview 3 2011; Loa 2012c), has increased public mistrust towards 
authorities regarding nuclear technology-related issues (Loa 2012a, 
2012b, 2012d; Chung 2005). Massive protests were organised in April 
2011, when emotions were still running high from the images of dis-
placed people and radioactive nightmares brought about by the Tsu-
nami in Japan (see Figure 1). In February 2012 (Loa 2012b) and in 
March 2013, 200,000 people took to the streets across Taiwan to 
commemorate Fukushima in its second anniversary and ask the gov-
ernment to stop the construction of controversial NPP-4 (Yu 2013; 
Women de Dao 2011). The numerous scandals and “incidents” sur-
rounding the lengthy construction (over 20 years) and several already 
mentioned scandals pertaining to the nuclear-wastes facility on Or-
chid Island have contributed to local residents having less trust in 
Taipower’s capability to manage the plant effectively and transparently.  
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Figure 1: No Nuclear Protest in Gongguan Area (ޜ佘)
Source: Simona Grano. 
After the “outing” of numerous political figures, both in the KMT as 
well as in the DPP, who openly expressed their opposition to NPP-4, 
among these Taibei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (Mo 2013a; Ku, Shih, and 
Wang 2013), by no means a friend of environmental activists, the 
KMT government came up with the idea of a legal referendum to 
settle the plant’s fate in early 2013 (Fell 2013; Chung 2013).  
Having advocated for a referendum on the nuclear issue for 
more than ten years, activists and DPP members initially disagreed 
with the way the question about the fate of NPP-4 was phrased. In 
their opinion, the question favoured the proponent (KMT) rather 
than the opposing side. However, the main dispute concerned the 
Referendum Act. According to Taiwanese law, a referendum can only 
be declared “valid” when the turnout of voters is higher than 50 per 
cent. Furthermore, at least 50 per cent of those who vote must vote 
“yes” for the referendum to have legal validity. The DPP’s main ar-
gument is that the KMT had deliberately phrased the question in a 
negative way in order to take advantage of the structural flaws of the 
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law; consequently, citizens who did not vote would be considered to 
have supported the construction of the plant. After the proposal to 
settle the issue with a popular vote, the few KMT members who had 
openly expressed their opposition to the construction of NPP-4 fol-
lowed the official party line, claiming that the referendum represents 
a chance to “let the people decide” (Shih 2013). In light of some 
recent events, however, it seems that instead of becoming more at-
tentive to people’s wishes, the KMT has simply realised that alienat-
ing an increasing number of individuals who oppose nuclear energy 
could backfire and threaten its position as the leading party.  
In fact, after the KMT first proposed the idea of settling the is-
sue with a popular plebiscite, the idea of holding a referendum lay 
dormant for several months, only to be revived after the Sunflower 
student movement (ཚ䲭㣡ᆨ䙻 , Taiyanghua xueyun) protest. This 
protest took place between March and April 2014, when a coalition 
of students and civic associations occupied the Legislative and Execu-
tive Yuan for three weeks, voicing their opposition to what they per-
ceived as a non-transparent behaviour of the government regarding 
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). The international 
visibility given to the protracted occupation, with several Taiwanese 
communities supporting students from abroad, put the government 
under extreme pressure. Riding on the wave of discontent towards 
the Ma administration, former DPP Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung (᷇㗙䳴, 
Lin Yixiong) launched a hunger strike calling for the cessation of the 
construction of NPP-4 (although he had to interrupt the strike after 
six days due to health concerns). His action triggered an emotional 
response among the general public, creating an even greater headache 
for President Ma. 
Finally, on 27 April 2014, President Ma announced that reactor 
no. 1 at NPP-4 would be sealed up and the completion of the build-
ing of reactor no. 2 would be temporarily suspended. The KMT 
maintains that this is a compromise to stall construction due to na-
tional mounting opposition, without scrapping the whole project 
outright, to avoid causing Taipower’s bankruptcy (Lee 2014: 3). In 
this case, as in the KPT case, strategic timing on the part of protest-
ers has been vital in order to reach a result.  
This “success story” in postponing the construction clearly rep-
resents only a bitter-sweet victory for activists, since the KMT’s ulti-
mate goal is to delay the final decision – out of pre-electoral concerns 
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(namely the November 2014 municipal elections) – while remitting it 
to a popular referendum to be held in the future. The DPP’s proposal 
to lower the threshold regarding the percentage of voters required 
has been rebuffed by the ruling party (Shih 2014). This, coupled with 
the fact that the KMT refuses to set a precise date for the legal refer-
endum, seems to suggest that the party is aware of what it might lose 
if voters express their opposition to the continuation of the plant. 
Here, as in the case of the KPT developmental project, “polit-
ical” interests are again the main drivers behind decisions that pertain 
to a more “ecological” sphere, especially when dealing with energy 
concerns and a powerful national industry whose monopoly resides 
with the state, being strongly linked to the issue of national sovereign-
ty. Thus, decisions regarding development projects that are deemed 
to be in the national interest transcend political party divisions. In the 
next section, I briefly summarise the main changes and continuities in 
Taiwan’s environmental policy arena in an attempt to gauge which 
dimension is stronger. 
Continuity Trumps Changes in Environmental 
Policies
During the 1990s, as Taiwan’s slowly became a democracy, political 
and social protests were used increasingly to manifest discontent. 
Counter-mobilisation on the part of the pro-development faction, as 
a reaction to the strong efforts for social transformation heralded by 
social movements, was also frequent (Ho 2005a: 414). While democ-
racy was advancing after the lifting of martial law, environmental 
concerns became more popular. Although such issues started to 
gather nationwide attention, dissent towards controversial facilities 
was often silenced with bribes and pay-offs and social activists lacked 
the incisiveness needed to effectively shape the policy making process 
(Lyons 2009: 60). As noted above, legitimacy for influencing future 
policies came when the DPP achieved more than one-third of the 
seats in the Legislative Yuan election of 1992, which de facto repre-
sented its establishment as a credible opposition force. Later on, with 
the DPP’s rise to national power in 2000, social movements became 
institutionalised and therefore able to effectively access national or 
local policies without the need to launch any confrontational activity. 
Paradoxically, this course of actions weakened the effectiveness of 
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the social movements and they entered a phase of hibernation that 
lasted throughout Chen’s second presidential term.  
It was only after the KMT regained the presidency in 2008 that 
social movements entered a new phase of mobilisation, characterised 
by a partial return to the use of mass protests and other more institu-
tional channels to express discontent. As the two case studies have 
shown, such acts of contention became a powerful asset for winning 
cases or bringing them to the attention of a wider audience.  
While the DPP has always been considered as the party that 
stands for environmental protection, both the KMT and the DPP 
legislatures have accorded priority to economic development for 
decades. This has led to the promotion and expansion of the nuclear 
and chemical industries, which are considered vital for the island’s 
economic growth, while relegating environmental concerns and pol-
icies to a secondary position. 
I would recapitulate the main characteristics highlighting the de-
gree of change or continuity in Taiwan’s environmental policy-mak-
ing as follows. 
First of all, continuity as applied to environmental politics in 
Taiwan takes on a negative connotation. One of the most significant 
problems relating to any large developmental project is prioritising 
economic profit over safety. This prioritisation seems to be a per-
manent feature of almost all developmental cases, from nuclear power 
plants and naphtha crackers to residential complexes, under both 
KMT and DPP patronage.  
Secondly – as seen in the KPT case – the EIA, which was estab-
lished in the 1970s as a mere economic policy-making tool (Ho 2004: 
238), has been gradually transformed into an important piece of legis-
lation, with a committee of professional experts called in to deter-
mine the potential impacts of a facility on the ecosystem and on local 
residents; yet, several problems remain. The EIA Committee is not 
yet fully independent and corruption and bribery do surface occa-
sionally (Chan 2013). As shown in the petrochemical plant case study, 
despite the solidity of the legal arguments employed by the protesters, 
KPT was only halted due to pre-electoral concerns and political mo-
tivations. Winston Dang, the minister of the Environmental Protec-
tion Administration during the last year of the Chen Shui-bian presi-
dency, said:  
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The KPT project should not have been approved by the EIA 
Committee because of its procedural flaws. The problem is that 
this [the EIA Committee] is not yet a truly independent organ (In-
terview 5 2011). 
Since 1994, the EIA law has stipulated that at least one-third of 
members must be professional and scientific experts. According to 
Professor Dang, however, the review process, is still often dominated 
and hijacked by the pro-development faction. This means that, even 
in those cases where the law states that a project should be halted, 
other more powerful dynamics of clienteles and corruption inhibit 
the EIA from being an effective and transparent policy tool (Tang 
2003), as seen in the case of KPT (Interview 5 2011). 
The EIA process, at least when social groups are fighting against 
traditional actors (politicians and developers) has no real power to 
stop those financial and monetary interests that often lie behind said 
developmental projects; in this way, the rule of law is diminished and 
seems to exist more in the books than de facto, in the sense of a truly 
independent legal system protecting the interests of disadvantaged 
groups. In short, the system is important but it can be easily manipu-
lated and distorted (Hsu 2013), especially in countries where patron–
client ties are still commonplace. What both cases have in common is 
that they reveal a deep sense of distrust among local residents and 
activists towards both central and local authorities, which are viewed 
as corrupt and in cahoots with the pro-business faction, as well as 
towards responsible agencies and business conglomerates and their 
non-transparent behaviours. Many projects that are deemed to be in 
the public interest, such as nuclear or chemical plants, have been 
criticised for the top-down approaches in which they have been im-
plemented, and for the secrecy surrounding dealings with local resi-
dents and other affected constituencies. The last decade has seen a 
shift away from technocratic and authoritarian management towards 
more comprehensive and voluntary-based approaches in which opin-
ions, interests and livelihood concerns of affected communities play 
an increasingly important role. Rules-based activism is crucial for 
guaranteeing that participatory requirements are upheld. Activists 
have tried to redress ecological imbalances and the bias towards eco-
nomic development that still features prominently in Taiwan’s green 
governance by engaging in rules-based activism, which calls on local 
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officials to enforce existing environmental rules. Unfortunately, such 
resilient habits are typical of both the DPP and the KMT. 
The 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou, which gave the KMT nearly 
total control over both the legislative and executive branches of the 
Yuan, also signified a full-blown slap in the face for the DPP, which 
lost much of its credibility as a valid counterweight to the govern-
ment. This, coupled with the ambiguous attitude of the DPP towards 
environmental problems during Chen’s electoral terms, led to activ-
ists being increasingly disillusioned with the party. When President 
Ma was elected for a second term in 2012, social forces that would 
eventually challenge its non-responsive behaviour vis-à-vis dissenters, 
started to emerge. The sporadic protests, which culminated in the 
above-mentioned Sunflower Student Movement, put the government 
under pressure and influenced its policies; for instance, in the deci-
sion reached in regards to the future of NPP-4. On the one hand, it is 
true, as some scholars have noted, that the recent small but recurrent 
“guerrilla-style” protests have been more successful at obtaining re-
sponses from authorities than the larger earlier protests that attracted 
more media coverage (Cole 2014). However, it is too soon to tell 
whether such novel social forces have been really effective in coun-
tering the government and influencing its decisions, at least as far as 
the environmental realm is concerned. There is no guarantee that the 
decision to halt NPP-4 will prove to be anything more than a well-
orchestrated manoeuvre to win popular sympathies in a electoral year, 
while deferring important decisions to a less sensitive moment.  
After the DPP lost the elections in 2008, the party was weak and 
incapable of functioning as a bridge between the government and 
civil society. Since 2012, the party has rebuilt itself while making sev-
eral attempts to initiate a dialogue with civil society, as shown by Tsai 
Yin-wen’s declarations after the Sunflower Student Movement (Wang 
2014: 1), and to utilise strategic external events such as the anti-nuc-
lear positioning to its advantage. However, social activists view such 
actions with suspicion, given that the DPP has previously betrayed its 
pro-environmental commitments, and consider the party as part of 
the problem. On the other hand, had the DPP been a strong coun-
terweight to the KMT, Taiwan would probably not have experienced 
such a vibrant phase of civic activism in 2013–2014. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be seen whether these movements can actually make a real 
difference in the long term by producing the structural changes that 
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the country requires, rather than a vicious circle of events that may 
initially seem successful before eventually reverting to the way they 
were. This is especially a risk for “secondary concerns” such as envir-
onmental protection and nuclear energy.  
Conclusions 
Today, Taiwan is a deeply divided island in political terms. The KMT 
and the DPP, with their respective allies (Taiwan Solidarity Union 
and People First Party) have divergent views on what is best for the 
country’s economy, the environment and future relations with the 
PRC. Such divisiveness is visible both geographically and ethnically. 
This highly charged political climate makes it difficult for the gov-
ernment to enforce environmental protection. This, in turn, results in 
the persistence of old habits, pitting pro-environmental forces against 
pro-growth and pro-business ones that prioritise job creation and 
national security issues. 
In light of the findings of the present article, however, it has 
been possible to observe a general positive trend whereby environ-
mental concerns have become more visible in the past few years, in 
the platforms of all the major political parties. While environmental 
issues were almost completely ignored in the 2004 legislative cam-
paigning and in 2008, they featured more prominently in 2012 due to 
several external factors, such as the Fukushima meltdown, which 
pushed environmental concerns, and related safety concerns, to the 
fore of the political scene. The same can be said for the pre-electoral 
period in 2014, as the government has been confronted by a series of 
popular protests on several issues, from nuclear concerns to the Sun-
flower Movement’s requests. 
As Ming-Yeh Rawnsley put it:  
These recent civic movements have struck a chord with a pre-ex-
isting element of modern Taiwanese society: a deep dissatisfaction 
with the nation’s increasingly polarized party politics, ineffective 
levels of representative democracy and widening social inequality. 
The nation’s democratic system – a legacy of Taiwan’s 20th-cen-
tury democratization – no longer seems adequate to the citizens of 
the 21st century, indicating that the island is in need of a ‘second 
wave’ of democratization (Rawnsley 2014: 8). 
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In light of this article’s findings, it is possible to draw two conclu-
sions. Firstly, environmental issues are enjoying a phase of high visi-
bility, due to several external circumstances such as the Fukushima 
incident, the Sunflower Movement and its link to the anti-nuclear 
protest, and Lin Yi-hsiung’s hunger strike. Secondly, even though 
activists are increasingly skilled at using available participatory means, 
decisions that pertain to the ecological sphere or to a developmental 
project are still made by the central authorities behind closed doors. 
However, without external and sustained pressure from activists and 
opponents, both projects analysed in this article would have gone 
ahead, thus proving that public opinion is the most powerful tool 
with which to bring about changes. What Taiwan needs, and what the 
thousands of students protesting between March and April 2014 were 
calling for, is more cooperative and transparent behaviour from au-
thorities.  
We can conclude that even though the “business as usual” men-
tality is still predominant, two recent high-profile cases have shown 
how, through sustained protest, by making use of strategic timing in 
pre-electoral periods, it is possible to compel a state towards a more 
balanced development and being increasingly attentive towards envir-
onmental concerns. However, one must keep in mind that these two 
“victories” have both taken place before an election, when all major 
political parties were keen on attracting votes and keeping the elec-
torate satisfied. This shows that the political component remains the 
most significant in steering environmental decisions. It would be 
interesting to see whether the cases would have been stopped if pro-
tests did not occur in such “sensitive” periods.  
A distinctive transformation that has occurred gradually in Tai-
wan since the beginning of the democratisation process is that the 
conflict of interests between national regulations and local stakehold-
ers has, in the past few years, become influenced by new emerging 
powers and actors like social organisations, journalists and agencies, 
both at the local and national levels, who make extensive use of the 
new participatory channels available to the public. While the situation 
has certainly improved since those times when environmentalists 
were branded as liumang (⍱≃, rowdy) in the 1990s, several structural 
constraints have remained constant, spanning across different ruling 
parties and delaying the implementation of an effective system of 
environmental regulations. In the past few years, environmental 
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NGOs and activists have tried to redress a cultural imbalance that 
had turned environmental concerns into secondary aspects of the 
policy-making process regarding developmental projects’ decisions. 
In the case of KPT, for instance, environmental groups and their 
allies used legal channels to reveal irregularities and violations pertain-
ing to the Environmental Impact Assessment. They claimed that the 
project was in blatant violation of the law and should therefore have 
been cancelled. In reality, as we have seen, the project’s termination 
had nothing to do with activists’ successful use of the participatory 
means at their disposal and had much to do with politics. Both the 
naphtha facility and the nuclear one were halted due to pre-electoral 
concerns, reflecting the government’s fear of losing votes if such 
issues were not properly addressed. Hence, political concerns still 
take precedence over ecological issues in politicians’ agenda.  
Nevertheless, over the past two decades Taiwan has slowly built 
up its democratic structures. Candidates on both sides have learnt the 
thrills and pitfalls of having to compete for votes, catering to citizens’ 
wishes and needs. Once Taiwan’s increasingly eco-conscious citizens 
started paying more attention to their surroundings, signalling that 
they expect their government to do the same, environmental policies 
and concerns have also taken a more prominent place, both in the 
policy-making process as well as in public and media debates. This, in 
turn, has led politicians to address certain ecological imbalances, 
which were previously left aside, for later generations to deal with.  
In this regard, a final thought on the general theme of this topi-
cal issue – that is, “Continuity and Change in Policies in Taiwan” – is 
that there is a stubborn resilience in the way environmental manage-
ment in planning processes is handled. Public participation is a key 
element for effective environmental governance; however, despite 
Taiwan having witnessed an upsurge in activism and public involve-
ment in the past few years, the role of the public remains limited. 
While the legislation provides channels for the public to take part in 
policy-making processes or reviews (for example, the EIA), the pro-
business faction is usually the dominant one, successfully pushing 
numerous development projects through, even when these do not 
fulfil the regulations in place to avoid ecological damage. Strategic 
external factors, such as upcoming elections, are still far more effec-
tive at stopping projects that are unpopular, as shown with both cases 
analysed in this study.   
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During the past 20 years, in all of the major social and political 
developments and policy shifts concerning environmental regula-
tions, leaders on both sides have made calculated policy moves in a 
rhetorical direction, resisting real political pressure and structural 
change. The one constant has been that business still trumps eco-
logical concerns, although rules-based approaches are becoming in-
creasingly widespread with citizens aware of their rights and wanting 
to see them respected. 
For example, Taiwan’s anti-nuclear movement has experienced a 
revival after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, which was further 
strengthened by a series of domestic factors, such as the resurgence 
of social movements after 2008 and the DPP’s loss of influence as a 
valid political counterweight, which enabled anti-nuclear fears to 
cross the political divide (Ho 2014a). Despite this, the decisive factors 
swaying the government in one direction or another when it comes to 
environmental policies and polluting facilities are yet to be found in 
political and electoral motivations. Therefore, I would conclude that 
continuities are the most notable characteristics for environmental 
politics in Taiwan, which are still subjected to bigger concerns and 
political interests. Nevertheless, when public opinion becomes in-
volved and cases become of national (if not international) interest, 
then the government must take notice and yield to popular wishes. 
What remains to be seen is whether a more constructive mentality 
that places economic interests behind environmental safeguards will 
become the norm, even in the absence of political interests and popu-
lar “coercion”. 
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